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Abstract
Based on geolocalized mobile phone calls data, we study the mobility of refugees in
Turkey. We employ a gravity model to estimate the determinants of refugee movements
across 26 regions in 2017. To benchmark our findings, we estimate the same model for the
mobility of individuals with a non-refugee status. Beyond the standard determinants such
as the levels of income at origin, at destination and distances across regions, we find that
networks, provision of humanitarian aid and asylum grants are important determinants of
refugee mobility. Our paper deepens our understanding on how forcibly displaced people
may respond to economic, social and political factors in their location decision.
Keywords: Refugee Mobility, Gravity Model of Migration, Forced Displacement, Mobile




The Global Compact for Refugees, adopted in 2018, highlights the importance of mobility to
find durable solutions to protracted refugee situations. Nonetheless, the determinants of the
mobility of forcibly displaced populations remain scarcely studied. Understanding human mobility
in complex emergencies is essential for both operational and methodological reasons. For the
former, understanding how displaced population make their mobility decisions may help relief
operations to better target those in need of assistance. For the latter, researchers investigating the
consequences of forced displacement on hosting areas have either assumed that forcibly displaced
people choose their location in a quasi-random way (Godøy, 2017; Gro¨nqvist et al., 2012) or have
overlooked the dynamic nature of such location decision. Anecdotal evidence suggests that for
instance, refugees may move multiple times within their country of asylum (Bose, 2013, 2014).
Turkey is an interesting case to study the mobility of forcibly displaced people within a country
of asylum. The movement of Syrian refugees in Turkey started in 2011 as a result of the Syrian
Civil War. Currently the official statistics report approximately 3.6 million refugees (UNHCR,
2019a). The ongoing conflict induced many refugees to remain in Turkey while others moved
to farther European countries. According to official figures, approximately 30% of the Syrian
population lives in government–run camps while the rest are dispersed within the country and
lives outside of camps. While the Turkish law does not grant relocation rights but only temporary
protection status, yet this temporary status is accompanied with the right to apply for a work
permit in certain areas and certain professions. As such, internal mobility within the borders of
Turkey is rather free for Syrian refugees. In some cases, relocation has even been encouraged in an
attempt to close down and relieve some camps (UNHCR, 2019b). As reviewed by Maystadt et al.
(2019), there is an emerging literature assessing the impact of refugees on the hosting economies,
including Turkey (Ceritoglu et al., 2017; Tumen, 2016) but little attention has been given to the
determinants of the mobility of refugees in this country.
In our study, we aim at gaining a better understanding of the mobility of refugees within Turkey,
thereby extending and complementing Beine et al. (2019). We exploit geolocalized call detail
records provided by Salah et al. (2018) within the Data for Refugees Turkey (D4R) challenge. More
specifically, we look at the location of 100,000 randomly selected mobile transactions (involving
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50,000 refugees and 50,000 non-refugees) recorded by cell towers to define likely decisions to
move across 26 regions in Turkey. Computing bilateral migration flows at quarterly frequency
and at regional level, we apply a gravity model to understand the main determinants of refugee
movements. We contrast our findings regarding the determinants of mobility with those of
non-refugees in Turkey that can be seen as a placebo analysis. Our empirical findings suggest
that distance, levels of GDP at origin and at destination, and network effects likely confer a
statistically significant effect on refugees’ mobility decisions. We find that distance matters more
for refugees than for non-refugees, in line with some stylized facts previously documented World
Bank (2018). Non-refugee population moves not only more but also longer distances than the
refugee population. Moreover, we find that for non-refugees, income acts as a pull factor at
destination only while for refugees, a low income at origin also acts as a push factor.
We further extend the standard gravity model by considering an additional set of determinants
of refugee mobility that captures the social and political conditions in the host and the origin
region. The integration of refugees is a major challenge for many countries especially for a country
like Turkey which hosts more than three million refugees. As such, regional conditions as reflected
in the news about violence, protests, provision of aid and asylum grants can act as push or pull
factors. Analytically, we find that humanitarian aid and asylum grants are discouraging refugees
from migrating.
Beyond the relevance of our study for relief operations, our contribution is threefold. First,
we contribute to an emerging literature exploiting mobile phone data to characterize human
mobility in emergency situations. Given their elusive status, there are no reliable data such as
administrative data or censuses capturing the internal mobility of refugees. Existing studies
relying on phone data have focused on mobility responses to natural disasters (e. g. Blumenstock
et al., 2016) and predicting disease propagation (e. g. Wesolowski et al., 2012).1 The mobile phone
data allows to overcome the lack of data on population displacement and to analyze mobility
patterns among refugees (and non-refugees to benchmark our results).
Second, the economic literature has widely focused on the gravity model to model migration
decisions (Ravenstein, 1985, 1989). Despite its simplicity, the gravity model has shown impressive
1This strand of the literature builds upon advancements over the last two decades on the use of new technologies
such as remote sensing, geographical information systems, and global positioning systems to study mobility patterns
in non-emergency contexts (Deville et al., 2014).
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predictive power, making it an essential tool for forecasting exercises between and within countries
(Crozet, 2004; Mayda, 2010; Garcia et al., 2015; Beine et al., 2016). The gravity model has
identified as the main determinants of migration the differentials in employment opportunities and
income per capita between the areas of origin and destination, together with the geographical and
cultural distance, as proxies for higher migration costs. Migrant networks are also identified as
reducing the cost of migration (Beine et al., 2011). However, the applicability of the gravity model
to forcibly displaced people is limited to international movements of asylum-seekers to OECD
countries (Hatton, 2009, 2016, 2017). Overall, it seems that the same set of factors explains the
movements of economic migrants and refugees across countries, albeit with different intensities. In
particular, geographical and political factors have stronger weight for refugees or asylum-seekers
compared to economic ones. Such conclusion is confirmed in the cross-sectional analysis of the
gravity model proposed by the World Bank (2018). The applicability of the gravity model to
forced displacement shows that the forced nature of population movement should not hide the
potential agency played by forcibly displaced people in their migration decision (Iba´nez, 2014;
Maystadt et al., 2019). However, the cross-country nature of this literature is limited in shedding
light on the determinants of mobility in complex emergencies. To the best of our knowledge, we
are the first ones to apply the gravity model to the mobility of forcibly displaced populations
within a recipient country in conjunction with highly disaggregated phone data that allows to
track people in a consistent way.
Last, we shed light on non-standard determinants of migration by further enriching the phone
data with news media at the regional level. We therefore contribute to another strand of the
literature that has augmented the gravity model of migration to political factors such as the
generosity of the welfare state (Razin and Wahba, 2015), the restrictive nature of the migration
policies at destination (Mayda, 2010), or the occurrence of terrorism and civil war (Naude´, 2010;
Dreher et al., 2011). Recently, Arif (2019) studies a wide range of factors among 103 source and
destination countries between 1990 and 2000 and stresses the importance of institutional factors
(e. g. economic freedom) as push and pull factors. Even within countries, such non-economic
factors play a role in migrants’ choice of destination within countries (Brauw and Giles, 2006;
McKinnish, 2007). Our use of news-related events underlines the importance of social and political
conditions for the vulnerable population. The policy implications are direct as we can trace
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mobility reactions to particular events. The incidence of events can be easily associated with
policies aimed to relief refugees, foster employment and political measures and hence, ensure
political and social stability. Indeed, in addition to standard results of gravity model, we show that
events related to asylum granting, humanitarian and economic aid are among the determinants
of refugee mobility in Turkey. Violent protests do not seem to matter much in the decision to
migrate by refugees.
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical strategy
we use in this report. Section 3 presents the data (Section 3.1) and some descriptive statistics to
help understand better the sample of our study (Section 3.2). Section 4 provides the empirical
results for our main research question (Section 4.1) and shows that our findings survive various
robustness tests (Section 4.2). Section 5 elaborates more on our empirical findings and studies the
impact of refugee networks on their mobility (Section 5.1), mobility of non-refugees (Section 5.2)
and the effect of news media on the mobility of refugees (Section 5.3). Section 6 provides some
implications for policy and concludes. All tables and figures to which we refer are relegated to
Section 7. Additional references are included in Section 8, the Appendix, at the end of the paper.
2 Methodology
We base our empirical strategy on the utility maximization approach, proposed by Roy (1951),
and further extended by Grogger and Hanson (2011) and Beine et al. (2011). The model has been
frequently applied to migration (Beine et al., 2016). It is based on agents’ decision to migrate in
order to maximize their well-being, and leads to the pseudo-gravity framework, which can be





where Modt is the expected migration flows between origin o and destination d at time t;
φodt represents the accessibility of location d for potential migrants (i. e. migration costs); ydt
2Beine et al. (2016) detail the derivation of the random utility maximization model of migration providing
micro-foundations to the empirical specification of the gravity model.
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represents the attractiveness of location d in terms of utility (e. g. expected wage, ...); sdt, the
ability of location o to send migrants (e. g. public expenditures, ...); and k stands for all locations,
other than o, i. e. potential destinations. The parameters of the model can then be estimated
after a logarithmic transformation.
In our application, we are estimating these parameters over a relatively short time-frame,





+ γ′sdt − δ′sot − φodt + εodt. (2)
where εodt = φo + ψd + pit + εodt can measure origin, destination and time fixed effects as
well as combination thereof, and an independent and identically distributed (iid) error term. In
our analysis, Modt represents the bilateral mobility flow of refugees between regions of origin o
and destination d at quarter t. φodt will take account of the cost of moving to d for potential
candidates to mobility in region o. ydt and yot capture both pull and push factors in regions d
(resp. o) and are proxied by regional income levels. Time fixed effects are introduced to correct
for seasonality in migration patterns and to capture the influence of time-varying global factors.
Finally, given the large number of zeros in the bilateral migration flows, relying on standard
estimation techniques (e. g. OLS) would likely lead to inconsistent coefficient estimates. As widely
adopted in the literature on the bilateral determinants of migration (Beine et al., 2016), we call
upon Poisson regression models that relies on pseudo maximum likelihood estimates (Santos Silva
and Tenreyro, 2006; Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2011).
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We first describe our data in Section 3.1. Second, we provide some descriptive statistics that will
help visualize and therefore better explore our sample in Section 3.2 .
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3.1 Data
The D4R Challenge and Constraints. The source of our data is the D4R, a non-profit
challenge with the aim of improving the living conditions of Syrian refugees currently residing in
Turkey. Tu¨rk Telekom (TT)3, in collaboration with the Scientific and Technological Research
Council of Turkey and Bog˘azic¸i University, along with other academic and non–governmental
organizations, organized an anonymized dataset of mobile call detail records (CDRs) of phone-calls
and SMS messages of TT customers. The data collected and provided by the company cover the
time period between 1st January 2017 to 31 December 2017.
The D4R provide three distinct datasets. Dataset 1 (Antenna Traffic) includes one year
site-to-site traffic on an hourly basis and it provides information about the traffic between each
site for a year period. A prerequisite is of course that one of the involved parties is registered
with TT and in this case the information is available only for the TT customer. Information such
as the total number of calls and total duration of the calls are available only in an aggregate
format. This information is available both for voice calls and SMS messages. While no personal
characteristics are revealed, there is information on the total number and the total duration of
refugee calls and SMS by antennae.
Dataset 2 (Fine Grained Mobility) randomly chooses a group of active users (who make calls
and send SMS) every two-week period and reports cell tower identifiers. This random-sampling
process is repeated for the whole year period. As in Dataset 1, there is no personal information
revealed, beyond the refugee or non-refugee status. The dataset provides information about the
base station ID, whether the call or SMS is incoming or outgoing as well as the day and hour.
Dataset 3 (Coarse Grained Mobility) is a randomly selected dataset of 50.000 refugees and
50.000 non-refugees that is being followed throughout the whole year. To ensure privacy the data
is provided with reduced spatial resolution, i. e. at the district (rather than the antenna which
was the case in the other datasets) level. There is information on whether the call belongs to a
refugee or not as well as the day and time of the call. This is the main dataset that we employ in
our analysis in order to construct the refugee mobility measures aggregated at the regional level.
3Formerly state-owned, TT is the first integrated telecommunications operator in Turkey. Vodafone and
Turkcell are the two other operators in Turkey. As of the fourth quarter of 2016, TT, Turkcell and Vodafone have
respectively a subscriber market share of 30%, 45% and 25% (Tu¨rk Telekom, 2019).
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The D4R dataset is collected from a sample of 992,457 TT customers. 184,949 are identified
as refugees and 807,508 as Turkish citizens. The D4R challenge is a unique initiative that allows
to study various aspects associated with refugee mobility. However, addressing such a sensitive
issue is a major challenge and maximum protection of personal data is a prerequisite. To this
end the data comes with several restrictions and shortcomings. First, to ensure the anonymity
of the phone users, all the above mentioned datasets are totally unrelated to each other. As
such, their combined value-added lies mostly in the aggregation of the data at some unit higher
than the antenna. Second, the data provider highlights that the term “refugee” is entailing to
asylum seekers, migrants, and any individual that may have a “temporarily protected foreign
individual” ID number in Turkey. Third, we cannot be sure if the actual caller is indeed a refugee
or a non-refugee. While not much is revealed concerning the individual characteristics of the
customers, we know approximately 25% of the refugee customers are identified as “female” and
the remaining 75%, as “male”. It is not clear though whether this allocation represents the actual
use of the phone. While they register with their refugee cards in order to connect, there is no
guarantee on who is eventually using the phone. It is however more likely that refugees may use
non-refugee phones rather than vice versa (refugee contracts have more limitations with respect
to the number of calls they can do). Fourth, we cannot exclude noise in the exact location of the
call. In some cases, the antenna location may not be precise as a line might connect to a different
antenna due to the capacity of the network. Last, missing data is another concern as in some
cases whole days of data may not be reported in the dataset (Salah et al., 2018).
For all the above reasons and given the scope of our research, we use the Nomenclature of
Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) by Eurostat. Similar to a large literature in regional studies
applied to the EU regions (Combes and Overman, 2003; Crozet, 2004; Hirschle and Kleiner, 2014;
Fischer and Pfaffermayr, 2018), we conduct our analysis at the NUTS–2 administrative level, i. e.
for 26 regions in Turkey.4 More recently, Mitze (2019) finds a stronger explanatory power of local
labor markets conditions during the global financial crisis at the NUTS–2 level, compared to
NUTS–3 level. We also aggregate the data over time, i. e. we construct quarterly measures of
mobility. This approach mitigates most of the above mentioned concerns. First, it allows us to
combine information and construct measures from D4R datasets. Second, it summarizes flows to
4Information on the NUTS statistical regions of Turkey is provided in Table A1 in Section 8.
8
other NUTS regions irrespectively of who is using the phone (it could thus capture movement of
the whole family). And last, it resolves imprecise location concerns since the data at NUTS–2
level is very accurate. It also mitigates the concern from the absence of reporting data on a
daily basis. This level of aggregation is also in line with our research question. Since we want to
capture “internal migration” flows, the desirable property of our geographical unit of analysis is
that it is not too small, in which case it could potentially capture commuting flows or regular
social exchange patterns. As such we chose NUTS–2 which balances the trade-off between a
sufficiently large unit of analysis and a large number of observations. Last, the NUTS–2 level
allows us to combine our constructed measure of mobility with high quality administrative data
available at quarterly level as well.5
A last concern about the D4R data is that while the sample of refugees is representative, it
may not be the case for non-refugees who are sampled based on the sample of refugee customers.
While it is unclear whether this sampling process generates any systematic bias in the data, we
focus our analysis on the refugee population to understand the determinants of their internal
migration. While we benchmark the analysis using the sample of non-refugees, we undertake this
exercise only for comparison reasons. This is also in line with our research contribution, i. e. the
gravity model for the refugee population, since the gravity model for natives has been extensively
analyzed in the relevant literature.
Dependent Variable: Refugee Mobility. Our main variable is the measure of mobility,
which we construct using Dataset 3, i. e. the dataset that follows 50,000 refugees and 50,000
non-refugees throughout the whole year. We construct migration rates at the NUTS–2 level and
at a quarterly frequency. The migration rate has the form Migration Rate ‘r’ ‘i’ where ‘r’ refers
to the refugee (i. e. R) or non-refugee (i. e. NR) status of the observation, and ‘i’ corresponds
to the minimum number of calls generated from a given province to characterize the latter as
the residence location (i. e. frequency filter of ‘i’ calls, in our case, we set ‘i’=10).6 To increase
the likelihood our measure properly reflects mobility in the location of residence and not in the
workplace, we restrict our analysis to calls that take place only between 8 pm to 8 am, i. e. hours
5Our results are robust to defining mobility at NUTS–1 (larger) and NUTS–3 (smaller) regional levels. We
report our results in Section 4.2.
6Under Section 5.2, we test the robustness of our analysis using a stricter mobility measure, i. e. with a
frequency filter of 20 calls, and using a more flexible mobility measure, i. e. with a frequency filter of 5 calls.
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that are less likely to be working hours, following the usual approach in this literature using
phone data (Blumenstock et al., 2016).




corresponds to leavers and Nii to stayers. As mobility is observed at the quarter frequency, it
represents movers between quarters t− 1 and t. By construction, any explanatory variable in our
analysis is therefore measured prior to the mobility at quarter t.
Standard Gravity Model Determinants. We employ two main sets of determinants of
mobility. First, we use the standard gravity model controls, i. e. variables that relate to the
attractiveness (resp. repulsiveness) of region d (resp. o) for prospective refugees, the so-called
pull (resp. push) factors.
At the NUTS–2 level we have systematic regional GDP data also available at the quarterly
level. Host and origin regional GDP constitute standard push or pull factors according to the
gravity literature. We obtain data on regional GDP from the Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK).
Proximity between pairs of NUTS–2 regions is measured using geodesic distances, i. e. the
length of the shortest curve between two points along the surface of a mathematical model of the
earth, based on the centroid coordinates.7 Distance here captures practical difficulties of moving
across these regions.
Refugee Networks. Networks at the destination province also play a key role in reducing
migration and assimilation costs (Beine et al., 2011). Networks constitute an essential pull
factor as they are likely to provide information or financial support to newcomers (Munshi, 2003;
Beaman, 2012; Dagnelie et al., 2018). In the absence of official measures for refugee networks at
the region-quarter level, we proxy such existing networks and their size by the relative number of
calls from refugees. We construct this variable from Dataset 1 provided by Salah et al. (2018)
where we compute the number of calls from refugees over the number of total calls per NUTS–2
region in a given quarter.
News Media. While the first set of controls is related to the standard gravity model, we
further extend our model to figure out other potential determinants that are of particular interest
to the case of refugees. We expect refugees to be a vulnerable group and to be hardly integrated
7The centroid coordinates are based on the WGS 1984 datum and we rely on Vincenty (1975) equations to
calculate distances.
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in most areas. As such, the broader social situation in the region where they live is very likely to
affect their decision to relocate. While regional conditions may as well affect natives’ decision to
migrate internally, they are expected to be more “immune” to these conditions on average as
they have deeper roots and can resort to alternative solutions.
To capture the implications of social conditions at the regional level we explore an additional
set of explanatory variables. We use the Global Database of Events, Language and Tone (GDELT)
dataset, a world-wide news media platform that is available for over 30 years, in over 100 languages
and is updated daily to construct a number of indices related to the incidence of news that could
directly or indirectly concern the refugee population (GDELT, 2019). The database consists of
over a quarter billion geo-referenced event records in over 300 categories. The platform is open
for research and analysis. It uses the Conflict And Mediation Event Observations (CAMEO)
system where a code corresponds to a type of event and is defined in a three-level taxonomy.
Each observation provides information in several layers. For instance, every observation has
information about the location, the involved actors, the impact of the event, the type of action, to
mention a few of the available categories. Another element available in GDELT that is essential
for our analysis is the tone of the news, i. e. whether it has a negative or a positive connotation
for the refugee population. Since the same type of news may have a different effect depending on
the tone, we also aggregate the news based on the tone.
With respect to location, each observation provides latitude and longitude, thus the data are
being reported at a very fine level. Using the geographic information system (GIS), we are able
to construct our events variables at the NUTS–2 level, in line with our main analysis. Moreover,
the news coverage also has time variation at a fine level and we can thus construct the same
measures at the quarterly level between January 2017 and December 2017. Using the EVENT
Record Exporter tool8 provided by GDELT, we first obtain all events that took place in 2017 in
Turkey. GDELT reports 768,751 such observations. Of those events, 245,249 are reported to have
occurred at a national level and 36,378 were not being assigned a specific location. We therefore
exclude those observations.
8The EVENT Record Exporter allows to export small subsets of data from the GDELT Event Database that
match the search criteria. By specifying a set of criteria for the event type and actors involved, along with an
optional date range, the system will search the entire GDELT Event Database for all matching entries and export
matching records as a CSV file (GDELT, 2014).
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GDELT provides information about several types of news. Of course, not all categories are
relevant for the scope of our analysis. We thus create variables for news that are relevant to the
refugee population. In particular we have chosen the following categories: violent protest; economic
aid; humanitarian aid and asylum grants. In GDELT, an event is given an id GlobalEventID
and there exists a variable EventBaseCode which shows to which category this particular event
belongs to.
Analytically, the aid variables in our dataset indicate news that either are humanitarian
or economic and are provided in NUTS–2 region d (resp. o) at quarter q. Aid is crucial as it
eliminates or at least partially alleviates financial concerns. In terms of interpretation, events
related to humanitarian and economic aid are also related to the literature showing that welfare
benefits may attract or retain potential migrants (Razin and Wahba, 2015). Political factors have
also been found to matter in other contexts. For instance, violent events have been found to
constitute important push and pull factors for international migration (Naude´, 2010). Researchers
from various disciplines have also been interested in measuring the impact of national policies
on asylum seekers’ health (Steele et al., 2002; Mills, 2012; Ziersch et al., 2017). A study from
Greyling (2016) finds that government assistance, culture, economic factors, crime, refugee status,
reasons for leaving the home countries, time spent and number of people staying in a house in the
host country are all policies that affect asylum seekers in South Africa. We therefore augment the
specification with variables capturing political factors such as protest against the local authorities.
Violent protests in our analysis should capture such political determinants of location choice
by refugees. Last, the news for asylum grants are directly linked with policy considerations
that have a direct impact on the decisions of refugees and their ability to integrate and to move
freely around the country. Events related to the granting of asylum status can also be directly
interpreted as a possible change in expectations (Cortes, 2014) and therefore, local integration at
origin or destination. We should acknowledge that the interpretation given to these hypothesized
drivers are subject to discussion and that a lack of evidence may be due to measurement errors.
Nonetheless, the extension of the gravity model to political factors allows us to compare our
results to a recent and growing literature on international migration.
We aggregate these 4 types of events quarterly and at the NUTS–2 level. For events categorized
as economic aid, humanitarian aid and asylum grants, we focus on those with a positive tone to
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ensure that selected events relate to actual provisions of aid, whereas for the events categorized
as violent protests, we focus on those with a negative tone to ensure that selected events relate to
protests. Imposing such restrictions, we end up with 9,808 aid events and 6,670 protest events.
Among the 9,808 aid events, 2,170 relate to economic aid, 1,414 to humanitarian aid, and finally
610 to asylum grants. Among the 6,670 protest events, 315 events relate to violent protests.
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Our sample is composed of 1,950 bilateral observations for which we have information about all
variables in our baseline specification (See Table 1 in Section 7).9 According to our mobility
measure, bilateral movements of refugees between NUTS–2 regions are limited, and amount to
0.6%, i. e. on average, 6 refugees per thousands moves to another NUTS–2 region from one
quarter to another.
Figure 1 in Section 7 shows the presence of refugees in Turkey in 2017. More precisely, the
Directorate General of Migration Management in Turkey provides yearly data on the presence of
refugees at the regional level. We divide these figures by the measure of the regional distribution of
refugees that we have obtained from our mobile phone data. The map indicates that administrative
data overestimates the presence of refugees in Southeast Anatolia – at the Syrian border – and
underestimates their presence in the northwestern (Istanbul, East Marmara and West Anatolia),
Aegean and Mediterranean regions. Figure 2 in Section 7 shows the mobility of refugees in Turkey
in 2017 as obtained from the D4R data. The first map corresponds to out-migration of refugees,
their origin, while the second map shows in-migration of refugees, their destination. As can be
seen from Figure 2, refugees tend to leave regions in the eastern part of Turkey for regions in the
northwestern, Central Anatolia, Mediterranean and Istanbul.
For the levels of income at origin and destination, we use data on quarterly GDP per capita
from TUIK. Numbers are reported in Turkish Lira. As can be seen from Table 1, based on our
study sample, the lowest income corresponds approximately to 328 TRY and this is the income
in S¸anlıurfa region (in first quarter). The highest income is approximately 1,734 TRY in I˙stanbul
region (in third quarter). The mean income is approximately 856 TRY and this is equivalent to
9The number of observations results from pairing each NUTS–2 region with another NUTS–2 region, given the
bilateral nature of mobility. We do so for every quarter of the year 2017. Table A2 in Section 8 provides a detailed
description for all the variables we use in our study.
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the income in Konya region.
The shortest distance is approximately 96 kilometers and this is the distance between the
Gaziantep and Hatay regions while the longest distance is approximately 1,400 kilometers,
between Van and Tekirdag˘ regions. The mean distance is approximately 580 kilometers and this
is equivalent to the distance between I˙stanbul and Samsun regions.
Figure 3 and Table 2 in Section 7 offer a comparison between the mobility of refugees and
non-refugees in our sample based on the frequency of their moves and the distance they travel.
Interestingly, according to our mobility measure, non-refugees move more often and further than
refugees. On average, refugees travel 582 kilometers while non-refugees traveled 733 kilometers. No
refugees in our sample covers a cumulated distance larger than 2,500 kilometers while cumulated
distance over the total year 2017 exceeds 3,000 kilometers for some non-refugees. However, the
distance of refugee and non-refugee mobility is similar for distances between 0-1000 kilometers
and non-refugees move more and further for distances exceeding 1,000 kilometers. Overall, this
analysis of distance for refugees and non-refugees is in line with some previous evidence, such as
World Bank (2018).10
Table 1 shows that a maximum of approximately 30% of calls were refugee calls and I˙stanbul
is the region with the highest number of refugee calls, while a minimum of approximately 3% of
calls were refugee calls in Ag˘rı region. On average 13% of the calls were refugee calls and this is
equivalent to the calls received in Bursa region.
Based on our sample, there was a maximum of 99 events related to the provision of economic
aid and these took place in Ankara region (in first quarter); 30 events related to the provision
of humanitarian aid and these took place in Istanbul region (in third quarter); 9 events related
to the grants of asylums and these took place in Ankara region (in first quarter); and finally 68
events related to violent protests and these happened in Ankara region.11
10An histogram of the distance covered by refugees and non-refugees is shown in Table A1 in Section 8.
11Table A3 in Section 8 shows the distribution of events in our sample for the whole year 2017. It can be seen
that Ankara provided the most economic aid and granted the most asylums whereas I˙stanbul provided the most
humanitarian aid in Turkey in 2017. Violent protests have mainly occurred in regions of Ankara and I˙stanbul.
Erzurum, I˙zmir and Kayseri also report some violent protests.
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4 Main Results and Robustness
This section presents our main empirical results. In Section 4.1, we discuss the results from our
benchmark specification while Section 4.2 displays results from a number of robustness tests.
4.1 Benchmark Results
Our benchmark analysis is based on a classical gravity model. Using equation 2 in Section 3, we
can write our empirical specification:
ln(Modt) = β0 + β1lnyot + β2lnydt + β3lnφod + δt + δo + δd + εodt (3)
where Modt is our measure of quarterly refugee mobility and we look at the effects of quarterly
income at origin yot, at destination ydt and distance φod across NUTS–2 regions in 2017 in Turkey.
δ refers to the fixed effects.
Following the underlying pseudo-gravity model in a double log form, we use a logarithmic
transform of these variables. We report robust standard errors to ensure the accuracy of inference.
Table 3 in Section 7 shows our benchmark results. In Column (1), we introduce the effect of
income at origin and at destination. In Column (2), we add the effect of distance across NUTS–2
regions in Turkey. Finally, in Column (3) we supplement our estimation with origin, destination
and time fixed effects. The specification under Column (3) is our benchmark and shows that a
low income at origin acts as a push factor while a high income at destination acts as a pull factor,
as predicted by the theory of gravity model of migration. Distance has an expected negative
effect on the mobility of refugees.
A 10% increase in the GDP per capita at origin decreases the likelihood to migrate of refugees
by roughly 8% while a 10% increase in the GDP per capita at destination increases the likelihood
to migrate of refugees by roughly 14%, both with a significance at 1%. A 10% increase in
the distance to be covered decreases the likelihood to migrate of refugees by roughly 6% with
a significance at 1%. It is interesting to note that these elasticities are in line with previous
estimates of the literature using gravity models on migration. For instance, Beine et al. (2011)
get comparable estimates of -0.613 and -0.341, respectively, although of lower magnitude for
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international mobility.
Table 4 in Section 7 highlights results with more general fixed effects. Column (1) of Table 4
is our benchmark. Column (2) displays results with origin and destination-time fixed effects.
This would account for any time varying destination feature such as regional specific hospitality
policies, regional specific labor market condition among others. Column (3) shows results with
destination and origin-time fixed effects accounting for any type of shock at origin. These cross
fixed effects allow to control for the occurrence of multilateral resistance that can lead to some
bias in the estimates of parameters in gravity models (Bertoli and Moraga, 2013). As can be seen
from Table 4, results remain robust to the generalization of cross sectional fixed effects interacted
by time, both for the sensitivity to distance and also to income levels.
4.2 Robustness
It is desirable to conduct several robustness checks to assess the sensitivity of our results to
alternative methodological choices. These are provided in Tables 5 and 6.
First, we look at the sensitivity to alternative choices with respect to the geographical level
at which data are aggregated. Column (1) of Table 5 reproduces the estimation from Table 3
Column (3) for the sake of comparison. Columns (2) and (3) show respectively the results from
conducting the analysis at a regional NUTS–1 and NUTS–3 level. There are 12 NUTS–1 regions
in Turkey while NUTS–3 regions correspond to provinces and there are 81 provinces in Turkey.
As can be seen from Table 5, results are in general robust to performing the analysis at
different geographic aggregations. We interpret this result as a support for the absence of strong
spatial dependence in our estimations.12 Columns (2) and (3) respectively indicate that a 10%
increase in the GDP decreases the likelihood to migrate of refugees by roughly 5% and 6% while
at destination a 10% increase in the GDP increases the likelihood to migrate by roughly 11% and
35%. At a NUTS–1 level, a 10% increase in the distance to be covered decreases the migration
likelihood by roughly 5%, and 9% at a NUTS–3 level.
Table 6 contains results from taking different minimum frequency filters to compute the
mobility. Column (1) of Table 6 is our benchmark. In Column (2), refugee mobility is computed
12Geographers refer to this issue as the Modifiable Areal Unit Problem (MAUP), which results from relying on
arbitrarily chosen areas to represent information and results in statistically biased effects.
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such that at least 5 calls in a given NUTS–2 region are taken to define the latter as the origin of
an individual, i. e. any individual characterized by less than 5 calls is dropped from our sample.
In Column (3), refugee mobility is computed such that at least 20 calls in a given NUTS–2 region
are taken to define the latter as the origin of an individual.
As can be seen from Table 6, results remain robust to having a more flexible approach as
under Column (2) or a more restrictive approach as under Column (3).
5 Discussion
In this section, we first extend the benchmark results by allowing the impact of refugee networks
on their mobility (Section 5.1). We then compare these results with those based on the mobility
of non-refugees (Section 5.2), which also provides some kind of placebo analysis. Finally, we
consider the impact of news media on refugee mobility (Section 5.3).
5.1 The Impact of Refugee Networks on Their Mobility
The literature on the determinants of international migration has emphasized the role of networks
in raising the attractiveness of some destinations (Beine et al., 2011). In this section, we consider
the effect of refugee networks. We therefore extend our gravity equation:
ln(Modt) = β0 + β1lnyot + β2lnydt + β3lnφod + β4lnN
R
dt + δt + δo + δd + εodt (4)
where NRdt represents the refugee network.
The impact of refugee networks on their mobility is shown in Table 7 of Section 8. Again,
Column (1) provides the previous estimates for the sake of comparison. In Column (2) we
introduce the relative number of refugee calls as a proxy for refugee networks. Refugee networks
at destination have an expected positive impact on the mobility of refugees. A 1% increase in
the network increases the likelihood to migrate of refugees by roughly 11% with a significance
at 10%. These results should be nevertheless taken with caution since they do not account for
the endogeneity issue at stake in this type of estimation. Since we do not have an instrument
of the network that is likely to be orthogonal to error term or to the unobserved time-varying
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dyadic component of the refugee flows, the estimate should not be seen as causal. The interesting
feature is that the introduction of the network show that the estimate of the sensitivity to the
income at origin and at destination is robust.
5.2 The Case of Non-Refugees
The case of non-refugees is interesting as it sheds some light on the robustness of our previous
results. First, in line with the higher sensitivity to distance of unskilled immigrants with respect
to other groups in the population, we should observe a lower sensitivity to distance for non-
refugees or natives. Second, this estimation provides a kind of placebo analysis for the impact of
network. If properly measured, our network variable should not be correlated with the mobility
of non-refugees.
The case of the mobility for non-refugees is shown in Column (3) of Table 7. It can be seen
from comparing columns (1) and (3) that income at origin does not constitute a push factor for
non-refugees while income at destination is a stronger pull factor. A 10% increase in the GDP at
destination increases the likelihood to migrate of non-refugees by 20% with a significance at 1%.
Interestingly, distance seem to matter more for refugees than non-refugees, which is once again
in line with the evidence brought by the World Bank (2018). Column (4) of Table 7 shows the
result of the impact of refugee networks on the mobility of non-refugees. As expected, this result
is insignificant.
5.3 The Impact of News Media on Refugee Mobility
We rewrite our specification adding event variables:
ln(Modt) = β0 + β1lnyot + β2lnydt + β3lnφod + β6Eot + β7Edt + δt + δo + δd + εodt (5)
where events at origin and at destination are denoted as follows: Eot and Edt.
Table 8 in Section 7 displays results of the impact of news media on the mobility of refugees
in Turkey. Column (1) is our benchmark. Columns (2) to (5) respectively add economic aid at
origin and at destination, humanitarian aid at origin and at destination, asylum grants at origin
and at destination and violent protests at origin and at destination. All columns include origin,
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destination and time fixed effects. All these regressions also include levels of income, at origin
and at destination, and distance.
As can be seen from Column (3) of Table 8, an increase by one standard deviation in the
number of events reporting the provision of humanitarian aid (5) for the average region (for a
population about 3 million) would decrease the likelihood to emigrate by about 3 percentage
points with a significance at 10%. Therefore, it seems that the provision of aid in Turkey does
allow people to settle in some location and reduces the need to find alternative ones. The evidence
runs against a social magnet effect in which refugees would favor destinations with higher levels
of aid.
6 Policy Implications and Conclusion
In this paper, we look at the determinants of the internal mobility of refugees in Turkey. A
good understanding of the patterns of refugees is key for the provision of aid and support by the
authorities. It is also important for the sake of predicting concentrations of these refugees in
some areas as they can induce some reactions within the population.
The existing literature on the mobility of refugees is scarce, especially due to the absence of
reliable data that track the movements of this category of immigrants. Due to the temporary
nature of their status and the massive lack of registration to the hosting authorities, one cannot
rely on traditional measures of mobility based on administrative data. This calls for alternative
ways of measuring movements of refugees. In this paper, we use a unique dataset of mobile phone
data to measure internal movements of refugees across Turkish regions. An additional appealing
feature is that we can compute similar measures for non-refugees, which allows to make useful
comparisons between the two categories.
This big data approach allows us to conduct a traditional gravity approach applied to migration
and to identify the main determinants of their movements as well as to compare these to the
non-refugee population. We find that refugees are highly sensitive to distance, in line with the
literature on economic migration showing that this sensitivity is increasing in the skill level of
immigrants. Refugees tend also to move more often, but on shorter distances.
We also find that refugees respond to income differences between regions. They tend to
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leave poor areas and are attracted by high-income regions. This contrasts with the patterns of
non-refugees who do not display any sensitivity to income at origin. Finally, we find that refugees
are sensitive to humanitarian aid and asylum grants. An increase of the provision of these services
tends to decrease their probability of moving out of their current location. In contrast, we do not
find any evidence of a social magnet effect through which refugees would favor locations providing
higher levels of these services.
7 Tables and Figures
The following pages present tables and figures, which we refer to in the main text.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of the Variables.
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Dependent Variables
Mobility of Refugees 1950 0.006 0.022 0 0.333
Explanatory Variables
Income Per Capita 1950 855.898 276.491 327.743 1734.066
Distance 1950 580.118 314.576 95.520 1398.486
Network 1950 0.128 0.059 0.035 0.298
Economic Aid 1950 5.186 9.411 0 99
Humanitarian Aid 1950 2.902 4.732 0 30
Asylum Grant 1950 0.529 0.900 0 9























































































































Figure 3: Distance Covered by Refugees and Non-Refugees.
Table 2: Average Traveled Distance and Number of Moves of Refugees
and Non-Refugees.
Refugees Non-Refugees
Average Traveled Distance (km/movers) 581,7 733,2





Table 3: Benchmark Analysis:
The Impact of Gravity Model Determinants on Refugee Mobility in Turkey.
Dep. Var: Mobility of Refugees
NUTS–2 Regional Analysis
(1) (2) (3)
Log GDP per capita at origin -0.564* -0.742*** -0.759***
(0.295) (0.264) (0.169)
Log GDP per capita at destination 2.369*** 2.412*** 1.405***
(0.405) (0.400) (0.246)
Log Distance -0.236 -0.595***
(0.183) (0.115)
Constant -17.58*** -15.22*** -5.172**
(3.780) (3.865) (2.530)
Fixed Effects [o, d, t] No No Yes
Regions 26 26 26
Observations 1,950 1,950 1,950
R-squared 0.074 0.075 0.357
Summary: This table presents the estimates from our benchmark specification and
establishes the effect of the classical gravity model determinants on refugee mobility in
Turkey. In Column (1) we introduce the logarithm of GDP per capita at origin and at
destination. In Column (2) we introduce the logarithm of distance. Finally, in Column (3)
we introduce origin, destination and time [o, d, t] fixed effects and obtain coefficients of
our empirical specification 3. The specification in Column (3) is our benchmark.




corresponds to leavers and Nii to stayers, and which is of the form Migration Rate ‘r’ ‘i’ where
‘r’ refers to the refugee (resp. non-refugee) status of the observation, and ‘i’ corresponds
to the minimum number of incoming and outgoing calls generated from a given region (i. e.
NUTS–2) between 8 pm and 8 am to characterize the latter as the residence location of
an individual (i. e. frequency filter of 10 calls); (ii) Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses; (iii) *** denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent level (p < 0.01), ** at
the 5 percent level (p < 0.05), and * at the 10 percent level (p < 0.10), all for two-sided
hypothesis tests.
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Table 4: Robustness Tests on Benchmark Specification.
Dep. Var: Mobility of Refugees
NUTS–2 Regional Analysis
(1) (2) (3)
Log GDP per capita at origin -0.759*** -0.759***
(0.169) (0.170)
Log GDP per capita at destination 1.405*** 1.405***
(0.246) (0.235)
Log Distance -0.595*** -0.595*** -0.595***
(0.115) (0.108) (0.111)
Constant -5.172** 5.170*** -10.86***
(2.530) (1.453) (1.961)
Fixed Effects [o, d, t] Yes No No
Fixed Effects [o, d#t] No Yes No
Fixed Effects [o#t, d] No No Yes
Regions 26 26 26
Observations 1,950 1,950 1,925
R-squared 0.357 0.425 0.445
Summary: This table presents the results of robustness tests that are conducted on our
benchmark specification. The specification in Column (1) is our benchmark. In Column (2)
we replace origin, destination and time fixed effects [o, d, t] by origin and destination#time
[o, d#t] fixed effects. In Column (3) we replace origin, destination and time [o, d, t] fixed
effects by origin#time and destination [o#t, d] fixed effects.




corresponds to leavers and Nii to stayers, and which is of the form Migration Rate ‘r’ ‘i’ where
‘r’ refers to the refugee (resp. non-refugee) status of the observation, and ‘i’ corresponds
to the minimum number of incoming and outgoing calls generated from a given region (i. e.
NUTS–2) between 8 pm and 8 am to characterize the latter as the residence location of
an individual (i. e. frequency filter of 10 calls); (ii) Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses; (iii) *** denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent level (p < 0.01), ** at
the 5 percent level (p < 0.05), and * at the 10 percent level (p < 0.10), all for two-sided
hypothesis tests.
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Table 5: Robustness Tests on the Level of Regional Analysis.
Dep. Var: Mobility of Refugees
NUTS–2 NUTS–1 NUTS–3
Regional Analysis Regional Analysis Regional Analysis
(1) (2) (3)
Log GDP per capita at origin -0.759*** -0.463** -0.585*
(0.169) (0.203) (0.320)
Log GDP per capita at destination 1.405*** 1.098*** 3.515***
(0.246) (0.190) (0.845)
Log Distance -0.595*** -0.447*** -0.914***
(0.115) (0.123) (0.140)
Constant -5.172** -6.135** -20.11***
(2.530) (2.578) (6.524)
Fixed Effects [o, d, t] Yes Yes Yes
Regions 26 12 81
Observations 1,950 396 14,085
R-squared 0.357 0.622 0.151
Summary: This table presents the results of robustness tests that are conducted on the level of regional analysis.
The specification in Column (1) is our benchmark. In Column (2) we conduct the analysis at a NUTS–1 regional level.
In Column (3) we conduct the analysis at a NUTS–3 regional level.
Notes: (i) Our dependent variable is measured by a quarterly migration rate
Nij
Nii
, where Nij corresponds to leavers
and Nii to stayers, and which is of the form Migration Rate ‘r’ ‘i’ where ‘r’ refers to the refugee (resp. non-refugee)
status of the observation, and ‘i’ corresponds to the minimum number of incoming and outgoing calls generated from a
given region (i. e. NUTS–2 level) between 8 pm and 8 am to characterize the latter as the residence location of an
individual (i. e. frequency filter of 10 calls); (ii) Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; (iii) *** denotes
statistical significance at the 1 percent level (p < 0.01), ** at the 5 percent level (p < 0.05), and * at the 10 percent
level (p < 0.10), all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table 6: Robustness Tests on the Measure of Refugee Mobility.
Dep. Var: Mobility of Refugees
NUTS–2 Regional Analysis
Frequency Filter: 10-calls 20-calls 5-calls
(1) (2) (3)
Log GDP per capita at origin -0.759*** -0.668*** -0.873***
(0.169) (0.160) (0.191)
Log GDP per capita at destination 1.405*** 1.583*** 1.063***
(0.246) (0.233) (0.247)
Log Distance -0.595*** -0.532*** -0.561***
(0.115) (0.103) (0.139)
Constant -5.172** -7.297*** -2.704
(2.530) (2.332) (2.647)
Fixed Effects [o, d, t] Yes Yes Yes
Regions 26 26 26
Observations 1,950 1,950 1,950
R-squared 0.357 0.529 0.144
Summary: This table presents the results of robustness tests that are conducted on the
measure of refugee mobility in Turkey. The specification in Column (1) is our benchmark.
In Column (2) we take a minimum number of 5 incoming and outgoing calls to characterize
an individual’s residence location, i. e. a frequency filter of 5 calls. In Column (3) we take a
minimum number of 20 incoming and outgoing calls to characterize an individual’s residence
location, i. e. a frequency filter of 20 calls.




corresponds to leavers and Nii to stayers, and which is of the form Migration Rate ‘r’ ‘i’ where
‘r’ refers to the refugee (resp. non-refugee) status of the observation, and ‘i’ corresponds
to the minimum number of incoming and outgoing calls generated from a given region (i. e.
NUTS–2 level) between 8 pm and 8 am to characterize the latter as the residence location
of an individual (i. e. frequency filter of 10 calls); (ii) Robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses; (iii) *** denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent level (p < 0.01), **
at the 5 percent level (p < 0.05), and * at the 10 percent level (p < 0.10), all for two-sided
hypothesis tests.
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Table 7: The Impact of Refugee Networks and the Case of Non-Refugee Mobility.
Dep. Var: Mobility of Refugees Mobility of Non-Refugees
NUTS–2 Regional Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log GDP per capita at origin -0.759*** -0.759*** -0.156 -0.156
(0.169) (0.170) (0.187) (0.187)
Log GDP per capita at destination 1.405*** 1.375*** 2.019*** 2.012***
(0.246) (0.241) (0.197) (0.197)
Log Distance -0.595*** -0.595*** -0.436*** -0.436***
(0.115) (0.114) (0.0961) (0.0960)
Log Relative Number of Refugee Calls 11.28* 5.112
(6.421) (4.512)
Constant -5.172** -5.812** -14.85*** -15.19***
(2.530) (2.455) (2.075) (2.123)
Fixed Effects [o, d, t] Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regions 26 26 26 26
Observations 1,950 1,950 1,950 1,950
R-squared 0.357 0.363 0.656 0.659
Summary: This table presents the results of the discussion on the impact of refugee networks and the case of
non-refugee mobility. The specification in Column (1) is our benchmark. In Column (2) we introduce the logarithm of
the relative number of refugee calls as a proxy for refugee networks and obtain coefficients of our empirical specification
4. In Column (3) we look at the mobility of non-refugees. In Column (4) we add the logarithm of the relative number
of refugee calls as a proxy for refugee networks to the specification in Column (3), the case of non-refugee mobility.
Notes: (i) Our dependent variable is measured by a quarterly migration rate
Nij
Nii
, where Nij corresponds to leavers
and Nii to stayers, and which is of the form Migration Rate ‘r’ ‘i’ where ‘r’ refers to the refugee (resp. non-refugee)
status of the observation, and ‘i’ corresponds to the minimum number of incoming and outgoing calls generated from
a given region (i. e. NUTS–2 level) between 8 pm and 8 am to characterize the latter as the residence location of an
individual (i. e. frequency filter of 10 calls); (ii) Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; (iii) *** denotes
statistical significance at the 1 percent level (p < 0.01), ** at the 5 percent level (p < 0.05), and * at the 10 percent
level (p < 0.10), all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table 8: The Impact of News Events on the Mobility of Refugees.
Dep. Var: Mobility of Refugees
NUTS–2 Regional Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log GDP per capita at origin -0.759*** -1.043*** -0.726*** -0.636*** -0.673***
(0.169) (0.263) (0.171) (0.170) (0.188)
Log GDP per capita at destination 1.405*** 1.377*** 1.375*** 1.361*** 1.313***
(0.246) (0.251) (0.244) (0.248) (0.270)
Log Distance -0.595*** -0.592*** -0.589*** -0.586*** -0.599***
(0.115) (0.115) (0.114) (0.115) (0.115)
Economic aid per capita at origin 182.6
(131.7)
Economic aid per capita at destination 11.00
(40.05)
Humanitarian aid per capita at origin -208.3*
(110.2)
Humanitarian aid per capita at destination 71.75
(100.5)
Asylum grants per capita at origin -1,307***
(434.8)
Asylum grants per capita at destination 280.7
(420.5)
Violent Protests per capita at origin -118.8
(123.8)
Violent Protests per capita at destination 129.7
(142.4)
Constant -5.172** -3.377 -5.143** -5.699** -5.105*
(2.530) (2.858) (2.527) (2.514) (2.684)
Fixed Effects [o, d, t] Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regions 26 26 26 26 26
Observations 1,950 1,950 1,950 1,950 1,950
R-squared 0.357 0.359 0.364 0.366 0.364
Summary: This table presents the results of discussion on the impact of news events on refugee mobility. The specification
in Column (1) is our benchmark. From Column (2) to Column (5) we respectively add events on economic aid, humanitarian
aid, grant asylums and violent protests. We obtain coefficients of our empirical specification 5.
Notes: (i) Our dependent variable is measured by a quarterly migration rate
Nij
Nii
, where Nij corresponds to leavers and Nii
to stayers, and which is of the form Migration Rate ‘r’ ‘i’ where ‘r’ refers to the refugee (resp. non-refugee) status of the
observation, and ‘i’ corresponds to the minimum number of incoming and outgoing calls generated from a given region (i. e.
NUTS–2 level) between 8 pm and 8 am to characterize the latter as the residence location of an individual (i. e. frequency filter
of 10 calls); (ii) Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; (iii) *** denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent
level (p < 0.01), ** at the 5 percent level (p < 0.05), and * at the 10 percent level (p < 0.10), all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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8 Appendix
The following pages present additional references, which we refer to in the main text.
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Table A1: NUTS Statistical Regions of Turkey.
NUTS–1 NUTS–2 NUTS–3
Regions Subregions Provinces
Istanbul (TR1) Istanbul (TR10) Istanbul (TR100)
West Marmara (TR2) Tekirdag˘ (TR21) Tekirdag˘ (TR211)
Edirne (TR212)
Kırklareli (TR213)
Balıkesir (TR22) Balıkesir (TR221)
C¸anakkale (TR222)
Aegean (TR3) Izmir (TR31) I˙zmir (TR310)
Aydın (TR32) Aydın (TR321)
Denizli (TR322)
Mug˘la (TR323)




East Marmara (TR4) Bursa (TR41) Bursa (TR411)
Eskis¸ehir (TR412)
Bilecik (TR413)





West Anatolia (TR5) Ankara (TR51) Ankara (TR510)
Konya (TR52) Konya (TR521)
Karaman (TR522)
Mediterranean (TR6) Antalya (TR61) Antalya (TR611)
Isparta (TR612)
Burdur (TR613)
Adana (TR62) Adana (TR621)
Mersin (TR622)









Kayseri (TR72) Kayseri (TR721)
Sivas (TR722)
Yozgat (TR723)
West Black Sea (TR8) Zonguldak (TR81) Zonguldak (TR811)
Karabu¨k (TR812)
Bartın (TR813)
Kastamonu (TR82) Kastamonu (TR821)
C¸ankırı (TR822)
Sinop (TR823)










Northeast Anatolia (TRA) Erzurum (TRA1) Erzurum (TRA11)
Erzincan (TRA12)
Bayburt (TRA13)












Southeast Anatolia (TRC) Gaziantep (TRC1) Gaziantep (TRC11)
Adıyaman (TRC12)
Kilis (TRC13)
S¸anlıurfa (TRC2) S¸anlıurfa (TRC21)
Diyarbakır (TRC22)










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure A1: Histogram of the Distance Covered by Refugees and Non-Refugees.
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Table A3: Distribution of Events in 2017 across NUTS–2 regions in Turkey.
NUTS–2
Subregions
Economic Aid Humanitarian Aid Asylum Grants Violent Protests
I˙stanbul (TR10) 161 87 6 107
Tekirdag˘ (TR21) 10 0 1 2
Balıkesir (TR22) 9 5 1 1
I˙zmir (TR31) 84 20 3 7
Aydın (TR32) 5 2 0 0
Manisa (TR33) 10 5 0 0
Bursa (TR41) 40 0 0 1
Kocaeli (TR42) 8 8 0 0
Ankara (TR51) 195 81 12 150
Konya (TR52) 3 3 1 1
Antalya (TR61) 11 11 0 3
Adana (TR62) 20 20 3 4
Hatay (TR63) 11 8 4 0
Kırıkkale (TR71) 1 0 0 0
Kayseri (TR72) 3 24 0 6
Zonguldak (TR81) 3 4 0 0
Kastamonu (TR82) 4 0 0 0
Samsun (TR83) 0 2 0 5
Trabzon (TR90) 1 1 0 0
Erzurum (TRA1) 9 3 0 11
Ag˘rı (TRA2) 1 6 0 0
Malatya (TRB1) 10 1 5 0
Van (TRB2) 8 3 0 0
Gaziantep (TRC1) 35 10 2 5
S¸anlıurfa (TRC2) 22 26 0 6
Mardin (TRC3) 8 3 0 2
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